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BITCOIN COIN SELECTION WITH LEVERAGE
DANIEL J. DIROFF, AKVELON INC.
Abstract. We present a new Bitcoin coin selection algorithm, “coin selection
with leverage”, which aims to improve upon cost savings than that of standard
knapsack like approaches. Parameters to the new algorithm are available to
be tuned at the users discretion to address other goals of coin selection. Our
approach naturally fits as a replacement for the standard knapsack ingredient
of full coin selection procedures.
1. Introduction
A common problem facing Bitcoin wallet providers and exchanges is that of
coin selection, selecting Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) from their internal
collection to fund customer payment requests. In this context, there are many
contradictory goals that one usually has in mind. A great breakdown of these
issues is available in the master’s thesis of M. Erhardt [2].
A Bitcoin transaction is the record of an exchange of Bitcoin. It contains infor-
mation on the input funds (UTXOs) as well as where these funds are to be sent
(output funds). As incentive for a Bitcoin miner to pick up a transaction, a trans-
action fee is attached in an implicit form. The sum total of the input UTXOs will
cover more than the sum of the outputs, it is understood that what remains is the
fee. In this sense, it is the sender which has control over the transaction fee to be
paid. Today miners usually prioritize by fee-per-byte, and there is a market for a
typical fee-per-byte rate for certain expected confirmed times. For simplicity, in
our analysis we assume we have this market fee-per-byte rate given, which we will
denote by γ (the various different rates for different expected confirmed times we
will not address).
Due to the Bitcoin protocol, an individual UTXO can “only be spent in its
entirety”. Because of this, it is frequently the case that an additional output is
included, normally referred to as a change output, which sends the excess funds
back to the sender. The presence of this change output can be avoided if the total
value of the input UTXO is exactly enough to cover the outputs and the transaction
fee.
Moreover, transactions lacking a change output (a change-free transaction) are
smaller in byte size, hence a lower transaction fee is needed for the same expected
confirmation time. This goal of cost minimization is (one of) the main goal(s)
behind coin selection, in addition to others such as user privacy and addressing the
rampant growth of the UTXO set [2], [4], [3]. It will be the main focus of this
paper.
This coin selection problem naturally can be seen as a “knapsack type” problem
where, more-or-less, a standard knapsack algorithm can be implemented. In fact, a
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similar algorithm is currently being used for coin selection in Bitcoin Core, but as
mentioned above, there are other goals in mind rather than just minimizing cost.
In this work we propose a technique which we call coin selection with leverage
which aims to improve on the standard knapsack technique and to address the goal
of minimizing cost. Furthermore, the technique will have many parameters that
can be tuned at the user’s discretion to address the above mentioned additional
goals for coin selection.
In Section 2 we give the precise mathematical formulation of the problem as well
as the setup. In Section 3 we explain both the new leverage technique and the
standard one for which we compare. Section 4 includes simulation results done to
compare the two approaches. The code is publicly available on GitHub [1].
2. Statement of Problem and Basic Solutions
Here we formulate the problem precisely so as to set up a proper comparison of
our leverage technique with that of the standard knapsack approach.
Before we give the statement of the problem, there are some relevant constants
that we use below (we assume all transactions are the P2PKH format):
(1) γ: The market rate for the transaction fee-per-byte
(2) 10: Number of bytes required for metadata/overhead in a transaction
(3) 148: Number of bytes required to record each input in a transaction
(4) 34: Number of bytes required to record each output in a transaction
(5) d: The Bitcoin dust threshold, typically d = (148 + 34)γ Satoshi
(6) h: The “make change” threshold. Maximal overpayment amount (further
explained below).
The problem is somewhat elaborate, we formulate it as follows: We assume we
have:
(1) A finite sequence U of n UTXO’s available to the wallet provider. We will
typically denote this by:
U = {u1, u2, . . . , un},
and assume these are ordered in a decreasing fashion, i.e. u1 ≥ u2 ≥ · · ·un.
(More precisely U is an n-tuple in Rn).
(2) A finite sequence P ofm payment requests which are needed to be processed
by the wallet provider. We denote these by:
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pm}.
By assumption we take P to be ordered by urgency, i.e. the urgency for
the gateway to process payment pk is greater than that of pj if k < j. This
notion of urgency is not crucial for what comes below, but it will help in
simplifying notation and aid in intuition.
We break up the problem into two sub problems which we call basic and full.
Before stating what these are we make the following definitions:
Definition 2.1. A transaction is a 4−tuple (I, J, c, r) where I ⊂ U , J ⊂ P are
subsequences and c, r ∈ R≥0. We say:
(1) The size (in bytes) of the transaction is
Size(I, J, c, r) := 10 + 148|I|+ 34|J |+ 34(1− δc,0),
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where δc,0 is the kronecker delta (i.e. 1 if c = 0 and 0 otherwise). For
convenience, we will also make use of the function size, which is simply the
affine linear function
size(m,n, a) = 10 + 148n+ 34m+ 34a.
These functions are related by:
Size(I, J, c, r) = size(|I|, |J |, 1 − δc,0).
(2) The transaction is change-free if c = 0.
(3) The transaction is valid if∑
u∈I
u ≥
∑
p∈J
p+ Size(I, J, c, r)γ
and ∑
u∈I
u+ c+ r =
∑
p∈J
p+ Size(I, J, c, r)γ
(4) The transaction is good if it is valid and either one of the following two
cases hold:
(a) c = 0 and 0 ≤ r ≤ h (h is the make-change threshold from above), or
(b) r = 0 and c ≥ d.
(5) The cost of the transaction is
Cost(I, J, c, r) := Size(I, J, c, r)γ + r
(The units here are usually in Satoshi, i.e. consistent with the units of γ.)
One thinks of a transaction (I, J, c, r) as I representing the input UTXOs, J
representing the desired outputs (or payment requests), c being the change output
amount (which could be zero) and lastly r giving, what one might call, the overpay-
ment amount, i.e. the small extra amount given to the miner as extra incentive to
pick up the transaction. Note for r, it is desired that it be less than the make-change
threshold h which is usually taken to be less than the dust threshold d, otherwise
it reasoned that it should be returned to the sender in the form of change. This is
reasoning behind Definition 2.1.(4).
By a basic problem we mean finding a good transaction to process a fixed collec-
tion of payment requests. That is, given some specified J ⊂ P collection of payment
requests, we look for I ⊂ U , c, r ∈ R≥0 so that (I, J, c, r) is a good transaction.
By the full problem we mean for some fixed sub collection of payment requests
P ′ ⊂ P , finding a collection of good transactions T1 = (I1, J1, c1, r1), . . . , TK =
(IK , JK , cK , rK) that as a whole will process at least all of P
′, i.e. ∪Jk ⊇ P
′ with
the Jk pairwise disjoint.
We present below three algorithms which solve the basic problem, each of which
solves it with some slightly different goals in mind desirable by the BTC wallet
provider. These three algorithms are then combined in two different ways to create
algorithms to solve the full problem. We call these procedures Knapsack Coin
Selection and Knapsack Coin Selection with Leverage, the former of which is similar
to parts of what can be found being utilized today. The latter is the new technique
and we show below through simulations it’s utility.
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2.1. Basic Problem - Fallback Solution. The first algorithm to solve the basic
problem is what we will call the fallback solution. The goal of this algorithm is to
be a computationally quick and easy to implement and to attempt to minimize the
total cost of the transaction at the same time.
In detail, assume we are given M payment requests J∗ ⊆ P to process. Expand-
ing the cost function, we see that
Cost(I, J∗, c, r) = γ(10 + 148|I|+ 34M + 34(1− δc,0)) + r
is clearly minimized when the transaction is change-free, has zero overpayment and
utilizing the minimal number of inputs. Moreover, the number of inputs used is
most significant as (assuming the transactions are good)
Cost(I, J∗, c, r) < Cost(I ′, J∗, 0, 0)
for any I, I ′, c, r with |I| < |I ′|. In down to earth terms, this means that when
trying to construct a transaction, a good transaction with possible non-zero change
and overpayment is more desirable than a good change-free and zero overpayment
transaction with more UTXO inputs.
To this end, recalling U = {u1 ≥ u2 ≥ · · · ≥ un} is written in decreasing order,
we define for J ⊂ P some collection of payment requests,
opt(J) := min{k | ({uj}
k
1 , J, c, 0) is a good transaction for some c}. (1)
In other words, opt(J) is the minimal number of UTXOs needed to produce some
good transaction for the pay requests J . The fallback solution is then the transac-
tion taking the top opt(J∗) UTXOs as inputs.
Definition 2.2. The Fallback Solution to process the payment requests J∗ ⊂ P is
the transaction (I, J∗, c, 0) where
(1) I = {u1, u2, . . . , uopt(J)}
(2) c =
∑opt(J)
j=1 uj −
∑
p∈J∗ p− s(I, J
∗, c, 0)γ.
2.2. Basic Problem - Knapsack Solution. The main goal of the knapsack so-
lution to a basic problem is to produce a change-free transaction to save on the
cost of having a change output.
Let J∗ ⊂ P be a collection of M payment requests which must be processed.
In this case we are seeking a minimal cost change-free transaction, i.e. we are
attempting to solve the optimization problem
arg min
I,r
Cost(I, J∗, 0, r)
subject to:
(I, J∗, 0, r) is a good transaction.
For programming purposes, this problem should be translated into an integer
linear program, or rather in our case, a binary linear program. Recall, such a
problem is one of the form
min
x
cTx (2)
subject to:
Ax ≤ b
x ∈ {0, 1}n
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for x, c ∈ Rn, b ∈ Rm and A ∈ Rm×n. We formulate our problem as one such now.
Let x1, x2, . . . , xn denote the decision variables, i.e.
xj =
{
1 if UTXO uj is included in the transaction
0 otherwise
From above, note that the optimal solution (I, J∗, 0, r) to our problem must sat-
isfy |I| = opt(J∗). Hence, minimizing Cost(I, J∗, 0, r) is in fact the same as mini-
mizing the overpayment r along with the extra constraint |I| = opt(J∗). Moreover,
the overpayment r is then immediately written in terms of the decision variables
xi,
r =
n∑
j=1
xjuj −
M∑
j=1
pj − size(opt(J
∗),M, 0)γ
Recall the function size from above. With these observations, our problem as an
binary linear program is:
arg min
xi

 n∑
j=1
xjuj −
M∑
j=1
pj − size(opt(J
∗),M, 0)γ

 (3)
subject to:
(1) The number of inputs used must be optimal:
n∑
j=1
xj = opt(J
∗)
(2) The transaction must be good:
n∑
j=1
xjuj −
M∑
j=1
pj − size(opt(J
∗),M, 0)γ ≥ 0
n∑
j=1
xjuj −
M∑
j=1
pj − size(opt(J
∗),M, 0)γ ≤ h
(3) Each xj is binary:
xj ∈ {0, 1} for all j = 1, . . . , n
Definition 2.3. The Knapsack Solution to process the payment requests J∗ ⊂ P
with UTXO pool U is the transaction (I, J∗, 0, r) which solves the optimization
problem (3) i.e.
(1) I = {uj ∈ U |xj = 1} ⊂ U
(2) r =
∑n
j=1 xjuj −
∑M
j=1 pj − size(opt(J
∗),M, 0)γ
In practice, after some time period we usually cut off the algorithms search for
the optimal solution to 3 and accept a feasible solution. Depending of the size of
the various parameters, search times for the optimal solutions can be considered
too long and quickly finding some feasible solution is acceptable.
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2.3. Basic Problem - Knapsack with Leverage Solution. The idea of the
standard knapsack algorithm above is to try and find a minimal cost, good, change-
free transaction which processes a specified collection of pay requests J∗ by solving
a binary linear program.
The attempt at finding any feasible solution to the knapsack problem may fail
for several reasons (e.g. there is no solution or the algorithm fails to produce one in
a certain allotted time period). The first full procedure outlined below, attempting
to solve the full problem, first trys to find a knapsack solution, and if it fails to
then utilze the fallback solution.
The idea for the leverage solution is to not immediately use the fallback solution
but try and exploit the fact that once the standard knapsack algorithm fails, it is
known that there will be a change output in the transaction. The leverage solution
trys to produce such a transaction for which the change output is useful as a future
UTXO. That is to say, the leverage solution attempts to construct two transactions,
one processing the current pay requests J∗ and another processing some other set
J2, so that the change output of the first transaction fits precisely into the second
making it change-free.
More precisely, the leverage solution attempts to find I1, I2 ⊂ U , J2 ⊂ U \ J
∗,
c1, r1, r2 ∈ R≥0 so that:
(1) (I1, J
∗, c1, r1) is a good transaction processing payment requests J
∗
(2) (I2 ∪ {c1}, J2, 0, r2) is a good change-free transaction processing payment
requests J2.
One should note that in practice the change output c1 cannot be used as in-
put UTXO to process the second transaction until it is mined and a part of the
blockchain. So in that sense, the pay requests J2 could be representative of lower
priority pay requests (they will be processed in a block after that of the first trans-
action). A possible small alteration to the algorithm below would be to restrict the
search for an optimal J2 to a certain subset of P (other than P \ J
∗) that may be
more representative of these“low priority transactions”.
Let us formulate the leverage solution as a binary linear program. Our decision
variables are:
xi,j =
{
1 if UTXO uj is included in transaction i
0 otherwise
yj =
{
1 if pay request pj is included in transaction 2
0 otherwise
For simplicity let us assume that the first transaction will always be responsible
for processing the first M payment requests, J∗ = {p1, . . . , pM}. This allows us to
focus on the decision variables yM+1, yM+2, . . . , ym.
We then consider the following binary linear program:
arg min
x1,j ,x2,j,yj
n∑
j=1
x2,j (4)
subject to:
(1) Use a UTXO at most once:
x1,j + x2,j ≤ 1, for all j = 1, . . . , n
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(2) Use the optimal number of inputs for transaction 1:
n∑
j=1
x1,j = opt(J
∗)
(3) Process a certain number of additional pay requests:
M1 ≤
m∑
j=M+1
yj ≤M2
(4) Transaction 1 is valid with change:
n∑
j=1
x1,juj ≥
∑
p∈J∗
p+ size(opt(J∗),M, 1)γ
(5) Transaction 2 “needs a change UTXO”:
n∑
j=1
x2,juj ≤
m∑
j=M+1
yjpj + size

1 + n∑
j=1
x2,j ,
m∑
j=M+1
yj, 0

 γ
(6) Enforce change output is correct (1 of 2):
n∑
j=1
x1,juj −
∑
p∈J∗
p− size(opt(J∗),M, 1)γ ≥
m∑
j=M+1
yjpj + size

1 + n∑
j=1
x2,j ,
m∑
j=M+1
yj , 0

 γ − n∑
j=1
x2,juj
(5)
(7) Enforce change output is correct (2 of 2)
n∑
j=1
x1,juj −
∑
p∈J∗
p− size(opt(J∗),M, 1)γ ≤
m∑
j=M+1
yjpj + size

1 + n∑
j=1
x2,j ,
m∑
j=M+1
yj , 0

 γ − n∑
j=1
x2,juj + βh.
(6)
Note that for brevity we have used the size function and this does not break the
linearity of the constraints as size itself is affine linear.
Some more explanation of the objective function and the constraints may be
needed:
• Objective Function: This function counts one fewer than the number of
inputs that will be used in the second transaction (as one additional input
will be utilized as the change from the first transaction). The binary linear
program attempts to minimize this number so that the total cost of the
second transaction is minimized.
• Constraint (1): This is to simply guarantee that a single UTXO is not used
in both transactions.
• Constraint (2): This is to enforce the cost of the first transaction is minimal
(as here we are assuming there will be a change output).
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• Constraint (3): The number of pay requests processed in transaction 2
should be between two user set parameters M1 and M2. These parameters
are set at the users discretion to help aid in addressing other goals in mind
for coin selection.
• Constraint (4): Transaction 1 must be a valid transaction, i.e. the inputs
must be able to cover the cost of the outputs and transaction fee.
• Constraint (5): The total input amounts for transaction 2 must fall short
of what is needed to make the transaction valid. The gap will be filled by
the change output from transaction 1.
• Constraint (6): First of two conditions enforcing that the change output
from transaction 1 will match up with what is needed to make a change-free
good transaction 2.
• Constraint (7): Second of these two conditions. We remark that we are
not looking for a perfect match coming from the transaction 1 change c1,
just one that allows for the overpayment r2 of transaction 2 to be less than
the product of the make-change threshold h and a parameter we will refer
to as the leverage boost factor β. β is to take values in [0, 1] and should
intuitively represent how “greedy” the algorithm is being when it comes
to reducing the overpayment amount. We will expand on β and how it’s
chosen in Section 4.
Definition 2.4. The Knapsack with Leverage solution to process payment requests
J∗ ⊂ P is the pair of transactions (I1, J
∗, c1, 0) and (I2, J2, 0, r2) where:
(1) I1 = {uj ∈ U |x1,j = 1}
(2) I2 = {uj ∈ U |x2,j = 1} ∪ {c1}
(3) J2 = {pj ∈ P \ J
∗ | yj = 1}
(4) c1 =
∑m
j=M+1 yjpj + size
(
1 +
∑n
j=1 x2,j ,
∑m
j=M+1 yj, 0
)
γ −
∑n
j=1 x2,juj
(The change UTXO created by processing the first transaction which will
allow transaction 2 to be change free).
(5) r2 =
∑n
j=1 x1,juj −
∑
p∈J∗ p − size(Opt(J
∗),M, 1)γ − c1 (The slight over-
payment for transaction 2, chosen to be less than or equal to h).
3. The Full Problem and Solutions
Recall that by the full problem we mean the process of constructing transactions
T1 = (I1, J1, c1, r1), . . . , TK = (IK , JK , cK , rK) that as a whole will process at least
all of some fixed sub collection of payment requests P ′ ⊂ P , i.e. ∪Jk ⊇ P
′ with
the Jk pairwise disjoint. With combining the three algorithms for solving the basic
problem above, we construct two full algorithms which aim to solve the full problem.
One subtlety that should be addressed, but shouldn’t cause confusion is the
fact that the UTXO set can change. In particular, all pay requests, after they are
processed are transferred into a new UTXO. For a wallet provider, when a change
output is created, it is returned to their UTXO set and thus can be used in a future
transaction. Hence, in the transactions above, the set of inputs Ik strictly speaking
need not be subsets of the original UTXO set U , but rather could also contain new
UTXOs generated by processed pay requests at an earlier time. This of course, is
at the heart of the Knapsack Leverage algorithm.
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3.1. Full Problem - Knapsack Solution. The solution is comprised of perform-
ing a number of repetitive iterations of the same sequence of steps, after which the
UTXO pool and payment request pool is updated.
Let P ′ ⊂ P be a sub collection of payment requests with which to process.
Let Uk,Pk,P
′
k be the updated UTXO and payment request pools along with the
updated current payment requests to be processed respectively after iteration k.
Thus, U0 = U ,P0 = P and P
′
0 = P
′.
The Knapsack solution to the full problem is then: after completing iteration
k − 1, iteration k is
(1) Consider J∗k ⊂ P
′
k−1 the top M remaining payment requests according to
urgency.
(2) Attempt to solve the basic problem of processing J∗k with UTXO pool Uk−1
via a knapsack solution. If solution (Ik, J
∗
k , 0, rk) is found, payment requests
J∗k have been processed. Update UTXO pool Uk = Uk−1 \ Ik, payment
request pool Pk = Pk−1 \J
∗
k and current payment requests P
′
k = P
′
k−1 \J
∗
k
(3) If (2) fails, resort to utilizing the fallback solution (Ik, J
∗
k , ck, rk). Update
UTXO and payment request pool Uk = (Uk−1 \ Ik) ∪ {ck}, Pk = Pk−1 \ J
∗
k
as well as current payment requests P ′k = P
′
k−1 \ J
∗
k
(4) Continue onto next iteration until all of P ′ is processed.
3.2. Full Problem - Knapsack with Leverage Solution. This solution at-
tempts to improve on the standard Knapsack solution of Section (3.1) in reducing
the total cost to process all payment requests P .
As above, the solution is also comprised of performing a number of repetitive
iterations of the same sequence of steps, after which the UTXO pool and payment
request pool is updated.
Using the same notation for Uk,Pk and P
′
k as above, the knapsack with Leverage
solution to the full problem is then: after completing iteration k − 1, iteration k is
(1) Consider J∗k ⊂ Pk−1 the top M remaining payment requests according to
urgency.
(2) Attempt to solve the basic problem of processing J∗k with UTXO pool Uk−1
via a knapsack solution. If solution (Ik, J
∗
k , 0, rk) is found, payment requests
J∗k have been processed. Update UTXO pool Uk = Uk−1 \ Ik, payment
request pool Pk = Pk−1 \J
∗
k and current payment requests P
′
k = P
′
k−1 \J
∗
k
(3) If (2) fails then attempt to solve the basic problem using the knapsack
with leverage approach. If a solution is found producing two transac-
tions (Ik, J
∗
k , ck, 0), (I
′
k, J
′
k, 0, r
′
k) then the payment requests J
∗
k ∪ J
′
k have
been processed. Update UTXO and payment request pool as Uk = Uk−1 \
Ik,Pk = Pk−1\(J
∗
k∪J
′
k) and current payment requests P
′
k = P
′
k−1\(J
∗
k∪J
′
k).
(4) If (3) fails, resort to utilizing the fallback solution (Ik, J
∗
k , ck, rk). Update
UTXO and payment request pool Uk = (Uk−1 \ Ik) ∪ {ck}, Pk = Pk−1 \ J
∗
k
as well as current payment requests P ′k = P
′
k−1 \ J
∗
k
(5) Continue onto next iteration until all of P ′ is processed.
4. Simulation Results
Here we present results of several simulations run testing and comparing the
above two appraoches. The data used in the simulations were obtained from the
actual UTXO set on October 1st, 2019 and the payment requests were generated by
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Leverage Boost Factor β
γ (Satoshi Per Byte) M
22 2 0.94
3 0.96
5 1.00
10 1.00
60 2 0.78
3 0.96
5 0.94
10 0.98
200 2 0.54
3 0.64
5 0.84
10 0.96
400 2 0.52
3 0.52
5 0.66
10 0.86
900 2 0.22
3 0.44
5 0.64
10 0.82
Table 1. Choice of Leverage Boost Factor parameter β used in simulations
sampling credit card transaction data taken from the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection
Kaggle competition [6].
The simulations done used the following parameters:
(1) A UTXO pool of 2, 500 UTXOs, generated by a random sample from the
UTXO set of October 1st, 2019.
(2) A payment request pool of 250 payment requests, sampled from credit card
transaction data [6]. Transactions worth less than the Satoshi equivalent
of 4004 are discarded.
(3) The fee per byte rates γ tested are γ = 22, 60, 200, 400, 900.
(4) The parametersM1,M2 are deliberately chosen to agreeM1 = M2 and that
their common value M is one of 2, 3, 5, 10. The reason for this choice is to
be able to more accurately attribute the savings to the Leverage algorithm,
over simply the fact that more payment requests per transactions could be
processed. We remark that increasing the differenceM2−M1 > 0 inherently
increases the likelihood that leverage algorithm succeeds, thus even greater
savings is expected in that case.
(5) The dollar values below assume 1BTC = $8, 582 unless otherwise indicated.
(6) The leverage boost factor β has been chosen based on experimentation.
A value of β < 1 is sometimes required due to the unpredictability of
the various overpayment amounts. A smaller value of β is used to help
produce more savings for the leverage technique. The precise values used
are indicated in the Table 1.
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With the above understood, the simulations are carried out in the following way:
For each choice for the pair (γ,M), a random sample of 2, 500 UTXOs and 250
payment requests are drawn and each full algorithm (Leverage and No Leverage) is
run for 5 iterations. New samples of UTXOs and payment requests are then drawn
and 5 iterations are run. This process is repeated 10 times, guaranteeing that at
least 50M payment requests are processed. The Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the
results.
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Fallback Knapsack Leverage Payment Requests Cost per Payment
γ M Success Rate Success Rate Success Rate Processed Request (in USD)
22 2 0.94 0.06 0.0 100 $0.244890
3 0.96 0.04 0.0 150 $0.184722
5 1.00 0.00 0.0 250 $0.136694
10 1.00 0.00 0.0 500 $0.100444
60 2 0.78 0.22 0.0 100 $0.657344
3 0.96 0.04 0.0 150 $0.503280
5 0.94 0.06 0.0 250 $0.372113
10 0.98 0.02 0.0 500 $0.273701
200 2 0.54 0.46 0.0 100 $2.159708
3 0.64 0.36 0.0 150 $1.645127
5 0.84 0.16 0.0 250 $1.232979
10 0.96 0.04 0.0 500 $0.911609
400 2 0.52 0.48 0.0 100 $4.281211
3 0.52 0.48 0.0 150 $3.244493
5 0.66 0.34 0.0 250 $2.441034
10 0.86 0.14 0.0 500 $1.818567
900 2 0.22 0.78 0.0 100 $9.273401
3 0.44 0.56 0.0 150 $7.261839
5 0.64 0.36 0.0 250 $5.493654
10 0.82 0.18 0.0 500 $4.085761
Table 2. Simulation results utilizing standard Knapsack approach.
Fallback Knapsack Leverage Payment Requests Cost per Payment
γ M Success Rate Success Rate Success Rate Processed Request (in USD)
22 2 0.52 0.04 0.44 144 $0.239597
3 0.54 0.02 0.44 216 $0.181566
5 0.58 0.00 0.42 355 $0.134602
10 0.66 0.00 0.34 670 $0.099785
60 2 0.20 0.20 0.60 160 $0.641769
3 $0.36 0.06 0.58 237 $0.492071
5 0.38 0.08 0.54 385 $0.365785
10 0.48 0.02 0.50 750 $0.270931
200 2 0.00 0.40 0.60 160 $2.107687
3 0.24 0.26 0.50 225 $1.615732
5 0.32 0.16 0.52 380 $1.208484
10 0.44 0.04 0.52 760 $0.899072
400 2 0.02 0.52 0.46 146 $4.174872
3 0.10 0.48 0.42 213 $3.182614
5 0.24 0.36 0.40 350 $2.400355
10 0.46 0.06 0.48 740 $1.804518
900 2 0.02 0.78 0.20 120 $9.221179
3 0.14 0.68 0.18 177 $7.142914
5 0.26 0.34 0.40 350 $5.423762
10 0.46 0.22 0.32 660 $4.036800
Table 3. Simulation results utilizing new Leverage technique.
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% Savings Per Payment Savings Per Payment
γ M Request Request (in USD)
22 2 2.161472 $0.005293
3 1.708508 $0.003156
5 1.530141 $0.002092
10 0.655868 $0.000659
60 2 2.369357 $0.015575
3 2.227315 $0.011210
5 1.700473 $0.006328
10 1.012060 $0.002770
200 2 2.408727 $0.052021
3 1.786809 $0.029395
5 1.986702 $0.024496
10 1.375276 $0.012537
400 2 2.483857 $0.106339
3 1.907207 $0.061879
5 1.666475 $0.040679
10 0.772521 $0.014049
900 2 0.563130 $0.052221
3 1.637678 $0.118926
5 1.272223 $0.069892
10 1.198339 $0.048961
Table 4. A summary table comparing the Leverage technique to
the standard Knapsack approach.
As we see, across the various chosen parameters we saw a savings of about 1−2%
of cost per payment request. Depending on market conditions, this seemingly small
amount can add up quickly.
There are approximately 300, 000 confirmed Bitcoin transactions per day. For
a fictitious Bitcoin wallet provider/exchange that represents, say ∼ 2% of all
transactions, we can estimate that such an exchange would have approximately
12, 000− 15, 000 payment requests to process each day.
It is an assumption by the author that for such a fictitious wallet provider,
utilizing a UTXO and payment request pool size of 2, 500 and 250 respectively, is
reasonable. Although the author was unable to find data regarding UTXO pool
sizes, for entities with access to a large UTXO pool, it may be reasonable to imagine
first sampling a sub-pool to use for coin selection (for speed considerations for
example). In that scenario the results shown here may prove useful.
For such a wallet provider we estimate the following savings depending on market
conditions: Tables 5, 6, and 7 assume the value of a Bitcoin is similar to that of
October 2019 ($8, 582) while Table 8 estimates savings in extreme market conditions
akin to January 2018.
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% Savings Per Savings Per Savings Per Day Savings Per Month
γ M Payment Request Payment Request
22 2 2.161472 $0.005293 $63.52 - $79.4 $1,905.56 - $2,381.95
3 1.708508 $0.003156 $37.87 - $47.34 $1,136.16 - $1,420.2
5 1.530141 $0.002092 $25.1 - $31.37 $752.98 - $941.23
10 0.655868 $0.000659 $7.91 - $9.88 $237.16 - $296.45
Table 5. A glance at savings approximating market conditions
from October 2019 with one BTC = $8, 582 and γ = 22.
% Savings Per Savings Per Savings Per Day Savings Per Month
γ M Payment Request Payment Request
60 2 2.369357 $0.015575 $186.9 - $233.62 $5,606.93 - $7,008.67
3 2.227315 $0.011210 $134.52 - $168.14 $4,035.47 - $5,044.34
5 1.700473 $0.006328 $75.93 - $94.92 $2,277.97 - $2,847.46
10 1.012060 $0.002770 $33.24 - $41.55 $997.2 - $1,246.51
Table 6. A glance at savings approximating market conditions
from October 2019 with one BTC = $8, 582 and γ = 60.
% Savings Per Savings Per Savings Per Day Savings Per Month
γ M Payment Request Payment Request
200 2 2.408727 $0.052021 $624.26 - $780.32 $18,727.73 - $23,409.66
3 1.786809 $0.029395 $352.74 - $440.93 $10,582.3 - $13,227.87
5 1.986702 $0.024496 $293.95 - $367.43 $8,818.42 - $11,023.03
10 1.375276 $0.012537 $150.45 - $188.06 $4,513.37 - $5,641.71
Table 7. A glance at savings approximating market conditions
from October 2019 with one BTC = $8, 582 and γ = 200.
% Savings Per Savings Per Savings Per Day Savings Per Month
γ M Payment Request Payment Request
900 2 0.563130 $0.104503 $1,254.04 - $1,567.55 $37,621.25 - $47,026.57
3 1.637678 $0.237990 $2,855.88 - $3,569.84 $85,676.28 - $107,095.35
5 1.272223 $0.139864 $1,678.37 - $2,097.97 $50,351.2 - $62,939.0
10 1.198339 $0.097980 $1,175.76 - $1,469.69 $35,272.66 - $44,090.82
Table 8. A glance at savings approximating extreme market con-
ditions from January 2018 with one BTC = $17, 174 and γ = 900.
While the raw numbers above may be seen as optimistic, it is an illustration at
the potential in cost savings, especially in extreme market conditions as in January
2018. Of course, it is not clear if and when conditions will be that extreme again.
Nevertheless, even in relatively mild market conditions, Tables 5, 6 and 7 shows
the utility of our leverage technique.
In practice, a knapsack algorithm may be part of a collection of techniques used
in sequence in a entity’s coin selection procedure. Our new leverage technique
should naturally fit in as a replacement for the knapsack step. Furthermore, we
recognize that cost savings is not the only goal in mind when considering a coin
BITCOIN COIN SELECTION WITH LEVERAGE 15
selection procedure. To this end, one chooses the values of the various parameters
such as M1,M2 and β based on these goals.
The code used to run these simulations is publicly available on GitHub [1]. All
simulations were written in python and the various optimization problems were
solved with the aid of the Python library PuLP.
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